'hy do states provide sensitive nuclear assistance to nonnuclear weapon states, contributing to the international spread of nuclear weapons? Using a new data set on sensitive nuclear Y f transfers, this article analyzes the determinants of sensitive nuclear assistance. I first describe a simple logic of the differential effects of nuclear proliferation, which I use to generate hypotheses about the conditions under which states provide sensitive nuclear assistance. I then show that the strategic characteristics of the potential nuclear suppliers are the most important determinants of sensitive nuclear assistance. Explanations that emphasize the importance of economic motivations do not find support in the data. This article presents a new approach to the study of the spread of nuclear weapons, focusing on the supply side of nuclear proliferation. agreed to give up its nuclear program, but North Korea has already tested its first nuclear device, and Iran is making steady progress on its own nuclear ca pability. These are a few of the many important cases of sensitive nuclear assistance that have contributed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Yet, there is significant variation in the patterns of sensitive nuclear assistance. Although some nuclear capable states repeatedly provide sensitive nuclear as sistance, many others refrain from providing sensitive nuclear assistance altogether. Indeed, it is puzzling that states would transfer materials and technology that could help other states acquire nuclear weapons, the world's most destructive weapons, and weapons that could one day threaten the suppliers' very existence. This raises an interesting question about the moti vations of the nuclear suppliers: Why do states pro vide sensitive nuclear assistance to nonnuclear weapon states, essentially helping other states acquire nuclear weapons?
Scholars have explained why states want nuclear weapons (e.g., Sagan 1996 Sagan /1997 , the causes and conse quences of conventional arms sales (e.g., Blanton 2000; Kinsella 1994) , and the effect of nuclear proliferation on the probability of war and crisis behavior (e.g., Powell 1990; Sagan and Waltz 1995; Schelling 1960 ), but have not examined the supply side of nuclear pro liferation. I describe a simple logic of the differential effects of nuclear proliferation that is grounded in the nuclear deterrence literature. I argue that the spread of nuclear weapons is more threatening for relatively powerful states than it is for relatively weak states. From this basic insight, I derive three hypotheses about the con ditions under which states will be more or less likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance. First, the more powerful a state is relative to a potential nuclear re cipient, the less likely it is to provide sensitive nuclear assistance. Second, states are more likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance to states with which they share a common enemy. Third, states that are less vulnerable to superpower pressure are more likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance.
Drawing on a new data set on the international trans fer of sensitive nuclear materials and technology, I find support for this strategic theory of nuclear prolifer ation. I find little support for the idea that economic motivations determine the patterns of sensitive nuclear assistance. I find some empirical evidence that member ship in international institutions shapes the behavior of the nuclear suppliers.
This article presents a new approach to the study of the spread of nuclear weapons, focusing on the sup ply side of nuclear proliferation.3 The existing theo retical literature has paid overwhelming attention to the demand side of nuclear proliferation (e.g., Sagan 1996 Sagan /1997 and has thoroughly examined the factors that lead states to pursue or abandon nuclear weapons programs. Understanding why states want nuclear weapons is important, but demand-side approaches only paint part of the proliferation picture. Other states take actions designed to assist or impede states as they attempt to develop nuclear weapons. Many states with nuclear arsenals and advanced nuclear weapons programs received some form of external assistance from more advanced nuclear states. Contrarily, other states were prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons because states applied pressure on them in the form of technology denial, sanctions, or preventive military strikes. If we are to understand how and why nuclear weapons spread, it is necessary to understand the sup ply side of nuclear proliferation. This article provides the first theoretical explanation and empirical test of the causes of sensitive nuclear assistance.
EXPLAINING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND ARMS EXPORTS
The vast scholarly literature on the causes of nu clear proliferation has thoroughly examined why states pursue or abandon nuclear weapons programs (e.g., Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss 2004; Hymans 2006; Quester 1973; Sagan 1996 Sagan /1997 Solingen 1994 Solingen , 1998 Solingen , 2007 . In recent years, scholars have performed statis tical analyses on new data sets to further our under standing of the causes of nuclear proliferation (Jo and Gartzke 2007; Singh and Way 2004) . Unlike this anal ysis, however, these studies do not explore why states assist other states with their nuclear programs. Individ ual case studies have chronicled the development of national nuclear weapons programs (e.g., Cohen 1998; Holloway 1994 ; Lewis and Litai 1988; Perkovich 1999) , including instances of sensitive nuclear transfer, but this material has not been analyzed in a cross-national, or a theoretical, perspective.
Research on conventional arms sales has examined the effect of military transfers on regional stability (e.g., Kinsella 1994; Kinsella and Tilemma 1995; Sanjin 1999) and the causes of conventional arms exports in specific supplier states. For example, Blanton (2000 Blanton ( , 2005 has studied the link between democracy, human rights, and U.S. arms sales. Fuhrmann (N.d.) has examined U.S. exports of dual-use commodities that could be used in legitimate civilian applications or in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs; and Donaldson and Donaldson (2003) have explained a 2001 Russian Chinese military cooperation agreement. This liter ature has not, however, systematically analyzed the causes of conventional military assistance across the entire universe of supplier states, or examined the spe cific problem of sensitive nuclear assistance.
The literature on the consequences of nuclear prolif eration has explored how nuclear weapons affect crisis behavior and has debated the effects of nuclear pro liferation on the stability of the international system. Nuclear deterrence theorists argue that states will be reluctant to use military force against nuclear-armed states for fear of nuclear retaliation (e.g., Achen and Snidai 1989; Brodie 1946; Jervis 1989; Knorr 1962; Powell 1990; Schelling 1960 Schelling ,1966 . Studies on U.S. for eign policy concur that the United States will be more likely to back down in confrontations with adversaries, when those adversaries possess nuclear weapons (e.g., Betts 2000; Glaser and Fetter 2001, 69; Posen 2000; Powell 2003; . Building on the insights of the nuclear deterrence theorists, "proliferation opti mists" have argued that the spread of nuclear weapons actually leads to greater international stability because nuclear weapons deter military aggression (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Riker 1982; Mearsheimer 1990 Mearsheimer ,1993 Waltz 1979 . "Proliferation pessimists" counter that nuclear proliferation decreases international sta bility because greater numbers of states in possession of greater numbers of nuclear weapons increases the likelihood of preventive wars, crisis instability, and ac cidental nuclear detonation (e.g., Blair 1994; Feaver 1993; Sagan 1993 Sagan ,1995 Thayer 1994 ). Yet, these schol ars do not explain why states provide sensitive nuclear assistance, or explicitly propose an explanation for why states vary in their responses to nuclear proliferation in other states.
Others have suggested explanations for why some states may oppose proliferation more fiercely than others. Pilat (1985) and Quester (1983) argue that es tablished nuclear weapon states should be more likely than nonnuclear weapon states to take a strong stance against the spread of nuclear weapons because they have an interest in limiting the size of the nuclear club to maximize the relative advantage of nuclear weapons possession. Other scholars (e.g., Jabko and Weber 1998; Potter 1982 Potter , 1990 , and many journalists and policy analysts, attribute state behavior on nu clear proliferation issues to economic incentives. Ac cording to the economic logic, states will be unlikely to take measures to stop nuclear proliferation when 3 Forthcoming research on the supply side of nuclear proliferation includes: Gartzke and Kroenig (N.d.) 
There are many other costs associated with nuclear proliferation for these relatively powerful states. Nu clear proliferation may reduce the effectiveness of their coercive diplomacy. It raises the possibility that they could be pulled into mediating nuclear crises. It may distract them from other strategic goals as they de vote greater levels of strategic attention to new nuclear weapon states. Even if nuclear weapons are acquired by friendly states, nuclear proliferation can entail strate gic costs for relatively powerful states. Nuclear-armed allies may enjoy a greater degree of security indepen dence (Weber 1991) , reducing the strategic advantages that relatively powerful states can gain by offering mil itary protection.
In contrast, states that are unable to project con ventional military power over a particular state do not incur these strategic costs to the same extent when that particular state acquires nuclear weapons. These relatively weak states are not in a position to threaten or protect the security of that particular state, so they do not forfeit a strategic advantage as nuclear weapons spread. They are too weak?to intervene militarily, to use coercive diplomacy effectively, to mediate a nuclear crisis, to devote significant levels of strategic attention beyond their own limited spheres of influence, or to extend security guarantees.
In short, when a new state acquires nuclear weapons, the strategic costs are borne disproportionately by the states that once enjoyed the ability to project con ventional military power over that state. States that are better able to operate their conventional military forces against a particular state should fiercely oppose nuclear proliferation to that state because, in that in stance, nuclear proliferation will constrain their con ventional military power. The United States generally opposes nuclear proliferation to other states, for ex ample, and US. foreign policy makers and intelligence analysts assess that nuclear proliferation threatens the United States in part because it constrains US. mil itary freedom of action (see, e.g., Richelson 2006 ). States that are less able to use conventional military power against a particular state, however, do not in cur as many strategic costs when nuclear weapons spread to that particular state, and will be less likely to vigorously oppose nuclear proliferation to that state. When asked how nuclear proliferation in North Korea would affect Pakistan's security environment, Jehangir Karamat, Pakistan's Ambassador to the United States from 2004 to 2006 and former chief of the army staff, replied, "North Korean nuclear capability does not threaten us directly."7 Applying this logic to the problem of sensitive nu clear assistance, we should expect that nuclear supplier states will be reluctant to provide sensitive nuclear assistance in situations that would have the effect of constraining their own military freedom of action. In other words, the greater a state's strategic advantage over a particular state, the less likely it will be to provide sensitive nuclear assistance to that state. This logic gives rise to the first hypothesis: doing so is contrary to their economic interests. States in certain circumstances may even export sensitive nu clear materials and technology in search of economic gains. Unlike the analysis presented here, however, these authors look to nuclear weapons possession, or economic incentives, not conventional military power, as the key to unlocking proliferation preferences.
A STRATEGIC THEORY OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
Drawing on the nuclear deterrence literature, I extract implications about the differential effects of nuclear proliferation on states with varying levels of conven tional military power. From these insights, I develop a new, strategic theory of nuclear proliferation that I apply to the specific problem of sensitive nuclear assis tance.
Theories of nuclear deterrence maintain that nu clear weapons deter states from using large-scale, con ventional military force to pursue their interests (e.g., Achen and Snidai 1989; Brodie 1946; Jervis 1989; Knorr 1962; Powell 1990; Schelling 1960 Schelling , 1966 .4 If this is correct, we should expect that the spread of nuclear weapons is most disadvantageous to states that have the option to use conventional military power. States with the ability to project conventional military power over a particular state have much to lose when that particular state acquires nuclear weapons.
I define power-projection capability over a particular state as the ability to fight a full-scale, conventional, ground war on the territory of that particular target state.51 define relatively powerful states as states that have the ability to project power over a particular state, as defined previously. Relatively weak states are states that lack such a force projection capability.6
In interactions with a nonnuclear weapon state, rel atively powerful states can use their conventional mil itary power to their advantage; they can threaten or contribute to the security of the other state. Once the other state acquires nuclear weapons, however, this source of strategic advantage is certainly placed at risk and may be fully lost. The spread of nuclear weapons deters relatively powerful states from using conven tional military power to their advantage. Hypothesis 1: The more powerful a state is relative to a potential nuclear recipient state, the less likely it will be to provide sensitive nuclear assistance to that state.
It is also possible, however, that the opposite rela tionship between relative power and sensitive nuclear assistance holds. Relatively powerful states, because they may be better able to defend against, or deter, a nuclear attack, may be less threatened by nuclear proliferation and may, therefore, be more likely to pro vide sensitive nuclear assistance. This counterhypothe sis rests on the premise, however, that capable nuclear suppliers believe that nuclear recipients would likely use nuclear weapons, not just to deter foreign invasion, but to launch a nuclear attack. This premise is in ten sion with much of the nuclear weapons literature, which maintains that nuclear weapons are useful for deterring foreign invasion, but are largely ineffective instruments of warfighting (e.g., Betts 1987; Glaser 1991; Powell 2003; Schelling 1960 Schelling , 1966 . Still, this is a matter that cannot be definitively settled in the theoretical realm and is further evaluated in the empirical analysis.
Because nuclear proliferation entails costs for rela tively powerful states, other states may actually wel come the spread of nuclear weapons in certain situa tions. The spread of nuclear weapons may be advanta geous to states when it imposes strategic costs on other, rival states. Applied to the problem of sensitive nuclear assistance, we should expect that nuclear supplier states can provide sensitive nuclear assistance in order to im pose strategic costs on rivals.8 For example, from 1959 to 1965, France provided sensitive nuclear assistance to Israel, then Egypt's key rival, to constrain Egypt's growing military power in the Middle East (e.g., Cohen 1998). China's sensitive nuclear assistance to Pakistan in the early 1980s was widely seen as a means of imposing strategic costs on India and diverting New Delhi's strategic attention away from Beijing (e.g., Corera 2006; Paul 2003) . If states are to provide sensitive nuclear assistance to constrain rival states, we should expect them to provide sensitive nuclear assistance to states with which they share a com mon enemy. These are precisely the situations in which sensitive nuclear assistance can impose strategic costs on a rival state. This logic leads to the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: States will be more likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance to states with which they share a common enemy.
States that are most disadvantaged by nuclear pro liferation act to prevent it. The differential effects of nuclear proliferation invite superpower intervention.
Superpowers, states with global force projection capa bilities, suffer a loss in their strategic position when nuclear proliferation occurs anywhere in the interna tional system. For this reason, superpowers are partic ularly opposed to nuclear proliferation, and they at tempt to establish a hegemonic nonproliferation order to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.9 It was the superpowers that led the establishment of the multilat eral institutions of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).10 Moreover, in individual cases of nuclear proliferation, it is often superpowers at the forefront, putting together pack ages of carrots and sticks to rollback the spread of nu clear weapons. Superpowers use their power and influ ence to dissuade other states from exporting sensitive nuclear technology. Their success in inducing restraint depends on the potential supplier state's vulnerability to superpower pressure. States that depend on a super power to provide for their own security are likely to judge that the potential costs of jeopardizing a relation ship with a superpower patron outweigh the potential gains of providing sensitive nuclear assistance.11 For example, Argentina, a state in a formal defense pact with the United States, conceded to U.S. pressure and canceled a proposed sale of plutonium reprocessing technology to Libya in 1985 (Jones et al. 1998, 224) . In contrast, states that are less dependent on a superpower patron will be more likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance, despite superpower opposition. China, a 116 8 At this point, one may ask, "If the active promotion of nuclear proliferation can benefit some states, why is it not more common?" Taking seriously the argument presented here provides the answers to this question. First, there are only nineteen states that are capable nuclear suppliers and thus a limited number of states that have the opportunity to provide sensitive nuclear assistance. Second, many of the nuclear-capable states also have the ability to project power over potential nuclear recipients (see hypothesis 1) or are vulnerable to superpower pressure (see hypothesis 3). Third, states provide sen sitive nuclear assistance to constrain rival states (see hypothesis 2), but there is a finite number of situations in which a potential supplier shares a common enemy with a potential recipient. Fourth, states have tools at their disposal, other than nuclear assistance, to impose costs on rival states. With these conditions in mind, it is possible to think of some, but not many, cases in which the theory predicts sensitive nuclear assistance, but sensitive nuclear assistance does not occur. These cases are the subject of in-depth case studies being performed as part of a larger project. Spector (1984, 7-9) and Potter (1985) . 11 In theory, capable nuclear suppliers that lack nuclear weapons and that are dependent on a superpower could acquire nuclear weapons as a means of shifting the terms of dependence with the superpower.
Research on the demand side of nuclear proliferation has demon strated, however, that states in a defense pact with a nuclear power are less likely to acquire nuclear weapons (e.g., Singh and Way 2004 (Jones et al. 1998,52-3) . This leads us to the third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: States that are dependent on a super power patron will be less likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance.
The strongest challenge to these hypotheses is that economic incentives drive states to provide sensitive nuclear assistance. I therefore control for a wide set of economic factors. Scholars (Chestnut 2007; Horowitz 2004 Horowitz /2005 There are other potential economic explanations for the patterns of sensitive nuclear assistance. Scholars have argued that states that are open to the inter national economy may be less likely to seek nuclear weapons because they are reluctant to risk interna tional trade and investment on controversial foreign policies (Paul 2000; Solingen 1994 Solingen , 1998 Solingen , 2007 . Cor respondingly, states that are open to the international economy may be less likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance to avoid jeopardizing their international eco nomic relationships. Contrariwise, Jabko and Weber (1998) have argued that, due to its dependence on international trade, France may be more likely than other states to export civilian nuclear technologies. We may expect, therefore, that states that are more open to the international economy will be more likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance. Blanton (2000 Blanton ( , 2005 has found that the United States is more likely to export conventional arms to states with which it has a close trade relationship. Similarly, states that are dependent on a particular trading partner may be more likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance to that state to avoid undermining an important trade relationship.
There are clearly other plausible, alternative expla nations for why states may provide sensitive nuclear assistance. I discuss these in the next sections in which I describe the data and examine the evidence for the previous hypotheses.
SENSITIVE NUCLEAR ASSISTANCE DATA
To test this strategic theory of nuclear assistance, I con struct an original sensitive nuclear assistance data set. The data set contains yearly information for all capable nuclear suppliers and potential nuclear recipient dyads in the international system from 1951 to 2000. The unit of analysis is the directed-dyad year. Capable nuclear suppliers are states that could conceivably transfer sen sitive nuclear materials and technology to other states. States are coded as capable nuclear suppliers beginning in the first full year in which they successfully operate a domestic plutonium reprocessing or uranium enrich ment facility (Table 1 ). This group of states includes nu clear powers such as France, Pakistan, and the United States, as well as states such as Brazil, Germany, and Japan, that have mastered parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, but have not developed nuclear weapons them selves. Potential nuclear recipients are all nonnuclear weapon states in the international system.12 States with a nuclear weapons capability are not included as po tential recipients because the puzzle motivating this study concerns the motivations leading states to pro vide sensitive nuclear assistance to nonnuclear weapon states.
The dichotomous dependent variable is sensitive nu clear assistance. It measures whether a capable supplier state provided sensitive nuclear assistance to a poten tial nuclear recipient in a given year.131 define sensitive nuclear assistance as the state-sponsored transfer of the key materials and technologies necessary for the con struction of a nuclear weapons arsenal to a nonnuclear weapon state. Sensitive nuclear assistance takes three forms. States provide sensitive nuclear assistance when they assist nonnuclear weapon states in the design and construction of nuclear weapons, transfer significant quantities of weapons-grade fissile material to non nuclear weapon states, or assist nonnuclear weapon states in the construction of uranium enrichment or interest is in the occurrence of sensitive nuclear assistance, not just its onset. For this reason, I code as ones all years in which sensitive nuclear assistance occurs. As a robustness check, I also constructed an onset of sensitive nuclear assistance variable. For this variable, I coded as one the first year in which a sensitive nuclear transfer occurs within a dyad and then drop the dyad from the subsequent analysis. Using this alternate measure of sensitive nuclear assistance did not change the core findings reported as follows.
plutonium reprocessing facilities that could be used to produce weapons-grade fissile material.14 Sensitive nuclear assistance includes sensitive nu clear transfers regardless of whether they are pro vided under international safeguards. International safeguards allow for the monitoring of nuclear facilities to detect and report the diversion of fissile materials. States have, however, used the technological exper tise gained at safeguarded facilities to develop parallel, unsafeguarded nuclear programs, circumvented safe guards provisions, expelled international inspectors, and subsequently withdrawn from safeguards. Trans fers of sensitive nuclear materials and technology in crease the recipient's technical capability to produce nuclear weapons, regardless of whether they are pro vided under international safeguards, and are, there fore, included in this definition of sensitive nuclear assistance.
Sensitive nuclear assistance excludes other types of nuclear cooperation less relevant to the development of a nuclear weapons program. The provision of civilian nuclear assistance, such as scientific exchanges, assis tance in the surveying and mining of natural uranium, the provision of reactor fuel and services, and the con struction of research and power reactors, do not qualify as sensitive nuclear assistance.15 Why states decide to help other states develop the platforms that could be used to deliver nuclear weapons, such as bombers and ballistic missiles, is an interesting question, but beyond the scope of this article. Sensitive nuclear assistance also excludes transfers of sensitive nuclear technology to established nuclear weapon states or transfers that do not materially advance a state's nuclear program.16 1969a 1966? 1988e 1964d 1958e 1969' 1964^ 1966* 1970/ 1977' 1971* 1993' 1961m 1986n 1949? 1977? 1951? 1945r 1966s a Argentina operates hot cells for plutonium reprocessing at
Ezeiza (Spector 1984, 203 org/info/inf43.html. 9 India begins plutonium reprocessing (Jones et al. 1998, 112, 129) .
h Israel begins plutonium reprocessing (Cohen 1998, 231 (Holloway 1994, 188) .
p South Africa begins uranium enrichment (Jones et al. 1998, 243-4) . ?The British begin the operation of sensitive fuel-cycle facilities domestically (Gowing 1974 Jones et al. (1998, 317-22 1970-2000 1970-2000 1992-2000 1967-2000 1988-2000 1988-2000 1965-2000 1965-2000 1965-2000 1959-2000 1959-2000 1959-2000 1972-2000 1972-2000 1973-2000 1965-1991 1967-2000 1967-2000 1967-2000 1971-2000 1971-2000 1978-2000 1978-2000 1978-2000 1962-1992 Norway 1962-2000 1962-2000 1972-2000 1972-2000 1987-2000 1987-2000 1987-2000 1994-2000 1994-2000 1994-2000 1951-2000 1951-2000 1992-2000 1978-2000 1978-2000 1978-2000 1952-1959 1952-2000 1952-2000 1951-2000 1951-1963 1955-1990 1951-1967 1951-2000 1951-2000 The international smuggling of sensitive nuclear technology by substate actors, such as individuals, firms, or bureaucracies, without the government's knowledge or approval is not sensitive nuclear assistance as I define it. This statecentric focus permits the study of nearly every case of sensitive nuclear assistance be cause the substate smuggling of sensitive nuclear ma terials and technology is empirically rare. There have been one or possibly two cases of sensitive nuclear as sistance without direct state involvement.17 This empir ical finding supports the intuition that it is prime facie implausible that nuclear-capable states would not exert control over their most sensitive nuclear technologies and that substate actors could effectively conduct large scale, sensitive nuclear transfers without the knowledge and approval of senior government officials.18
To code the sensitive nuclear assistance variable, I
began with an online nuclear weapons database main other sensitive nuclear areas that Japan has not already mastered, 
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tained by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). I also drew on prominent reviews of the proliferation of nu clear weapons and on historical studies of countries' nuclear weapons programs.19 To be included in the data set, a case of sensitive nuclear transfer had to be verified by at least two sources. Appendix A lists the cases of sensitive nuclear assistance and explains the key coding decisions.20 A selection of cases in which sensitive nuclear assistance did not occur can be found in Table 2 and in Appendices B and C. (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972) and extracted using EU Gene (Bennett and S tarn 2000). Because a state's abil ity to project power over another state depends on the geographic distance between the two states, the capa bilities of the supplier are discounted by distance using the formula advanced by Bueno de Mesquita (1981) . I also construct an alternative power ratio variable, mea sured as the composite capability of the supplier state divided by the combined composite capability of the supplier and the recipient.
To measure whether the nuclear supplier and the nuclear recipient are threatened by a common rival, I construct enemy?1 This dichotomous variable indicates whether the nuclear supplier and the nuclear recipient share a common rival. The variable draws on rivalry data from Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) gives them confidence that they could deter attacks from new nuclear weapon states. Furthermore, nuclear weapon states may be more prolific nuclear suppliers because they are better able to provide nuclear assis tance related to the design and construction of nuclear weapons. The inclusion of this variable also permits an evaluation of the alternative hypothesis that nuclear weapon states will be less likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance because they have an interest in lim iting the number of states in the nuclear weapons club.
I also include a number of control variables. We may expect states, regardless of their level of conventional military power, to be reluctant to provide sensitive nu clear assistance to geographically proximate states. To control for this factor, I generate distance, a logged measure of the number of miles between capital cities, as calculated by EUGene (Bennett and S tarn 2000). It is likely, however, that the relationship between distance and sensitive nuclear assistance is nonmonotonic. Pre vious analysis has suggested that logistical problems may make it difficult for states to transfer sensitive nuclear technologies to distant states (Sands 1990) . To test for a nonmonotonic relationship between distance and sensitive nuclear transfers, I also include distance squared, a squared term of the distance variable.23
To assess the effects of economic motivations on state decisions to provide sensitive nuclear assistance, I include a number of economic control variables. Eco nomic development is measured as a country's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in constant 1996 dollars. Economic growth is calculated as growth = log (GDPt) -log (GDPt_i). Following Oneal and Russett (1997), I measure trade dependence as total trade (im ports plus exports) between the two member states of a dyad as a percentage of the GDP of the first state.
Openness to international trade is calculated as a state's trade ratio, total trade (imports plus exports) divided by GDP. The openness variable draws on data from Singh and Way (2004) . All other economic data are from Gleditsch (2002) and extracted using EUGene (Bennett and Stam 2000) .
I also control for a number of institutional variables that could affect patterns of international nuclear trade. International institutions are believed to affect state behavior through the establishment of formal rules that regulate state action and through the creation of informal norms that shape understandings of ap propriate conduct (e.g., Keohane 1984; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidai 2001; Krasner 1983) . The institu tions of the nuclear nonproliferation regime set re strictions on the transfer of nuclear materials and 
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Including a variable and its squared term in the model is a common method for testing for a nonmonotonic relationship (Ramsey and Sch?fer 2002, 244-5). technology, which may render member states less likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance. To measure the effect of international institutions on sensitive nu clear assistance, I construct two dichotomous variables. NPT measures whether a supplier state is a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.24 NSG mea sures whether the potential supplier is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.25 Previous research suggests that domestic regime type may affect a state's behavior on nuclear weapons issues (Singh and Way 2004) . To measure regime type, I use polity scores which range from -10 (most autocratic) to +10 (most democratic) from the Polity IV data set (Jaggers and Gurr 1995) .
One may expect that states will be more likely to pro vide sensitive nuclear assistance to allied states. Gowa (1994) has argued that states benefit from strong allies and that states engage in behavior, such as international trade, that empowers allied states. An alliance variable is not included in the models presented here, however, because contrary to the expectation of this alliance building hypothesis, states have never provided sensi tive nuclear assistance to a state with which they shared a formal alliance.26
I also control for factors that influence the demand side of nuclear transactions. Previous research (e.g., Jo and Gartzke 2007; Paul 2000; Sagan 1996 Sagan /1997 Singh and Way 2004; Solingen 1994 Solingen , 1998 Solingen , 2007 suggests that economic development, openness to the interna tional economy, economic liberalization, membership in the NPT, and threat environment shape a state's demand for nuclear weapons.
It is likely, therefore, that these variables also shape a recipient's demand for sensitive nuclear assistance. We may also expect that, like nuclear supplier states, potential nuclear recipient states that are dependent on a superpower patron may be more vulnerable to superpower pressure and will be less likely to receive sensitive nuclear assistance. The indicators of economic development, openness, NPT membership, and superpower dependence have already been discussed. To measure liberalization, I use a variable from Singh and Way (2004) that gauges the movement toward greater trade openness by calculat ing the change in openness over time spans of 3, 5, and 10 years. Disputes is an indicator for the security environment of the recipient state. It is 5-year moving average of the number of militarized interstate disputes per year in which a recipient state is involved. The mea sure is from Singh and Way (2004) 
DATA ANALYSIS
My central hypotheses concern the importance of rel ative power between the nuclear supplier and the nu clear recipient, the existence of a shared enemy be tween the nuclear supplier and the nuclear recipient, and the superpower dependence of the nuclear sup plier for understanding the causes of sensitive nuclear assistance. I employ Rare Events Logistic Regression (ReLogit) to test claims about the correlates of sensi tive nuclear assistance (King and Zeng 2001) .27 ReL ogit offers several advantages of particular relevance to the research question and data. Sensitive nuclear assistance is a rare event, occurring in about 1/1,000 of the observations in the dyadic data.28 ReLogit is able to model dichotomous dependent variables and to correct for biased estimates in rare events. In particular, Re
Logit is designed to analyze "binary dependent vari ables with dozens to thousands of times fewer" events than nonevents (King and Zeng 2001, 137) . Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering by dyad. Several types of statistical analyses prove useful in exploring the evidence for or against each of the hy potheses described previously. To begin the investiga tion, I examine the simple bivariate relationship be tween the key strategic and economic variables and sensitive nuclear assistance (Table 3) . For each mea sure, I also examine the bivariate relationship after the inclusion of cubic splines to control for temporal de pendence in the dependent variable (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998) . The bivariate analysis is only the first step, however. To control for potentially confounding factors, I then evaluate the effect of each of the ex planatory variables, including both control variables and the cubic splines (Table 4) .
27
Using Logit or Complimentary Log Log instead of ReLogit did not alter the statistical significance, or the direction of the sign on the coefficients, of the core results reported here. I also reestimated the models using nonparametric, matching techniques, as recom mended by Ho et al. (2007) . I performed three separate matching analyses with each of the three key independent variables (relative power, enemy, superpower pact), taking a turn as the treatment. To include relative power as the treatment, I dichotomized the variable, recoding scores equal to or greater than zero as one and recoding scores less than zero as zero. To preprocess the data, one-to-one nearest neighbor matching with replacement was employed, using GenMatch (Sekhon 2008; Sekhon N.d.; Sekhon and Mebane 1998) . I then repeated the parametric analysis, using ReLogit. The core findings were unaltered. Next, I applied a caliper that dropped ob servations that lacked sufficiently close matches, which I defined as observations that were more than one standard deviation away from their matched pair on any covariate. Again, I repeated the parametric analysis, and the key results were not affected. 28 Sensitive nuclear assistance occurs in 79 of the 81,952 dyad-years.
Due
to the small number of positive cases, it is important to know whether the results reported here are driven by the nuclear export behavior of specific nuclear suppliers. To examine this possibility, I
dropped dyads containing certain key countries and repeated the analysis. Sequentially removing the dyads containing China, France, Pakistan, and the United States, and reestimating the models, did not change the results. I first examine the hypothesis that relative power is negatively related to sensitive nuclear assistance.
Hypothesis
1 states that the more powerful a state is relative to a potential recipient, the less likely it will be to provide sensitive nuclear assistance to that state.
Turning first to the bivariate models, we see that the relationship between relative power and sensitive nu clear assistance is negative and statistically significant in both models. Next, an examination of the multi variate regressions reveals a similar pattern. Again, the sign on the coefficient is negative and statistically significant in each and every model.29 There is strong empirical support for the causal significance of the relative power differential between the nuclear sup plier and the nuclear recipient for understanding sen sitive nuclear assistance. The counterhypothesis that 29 These results were robust when power ratio was substituted for relative power.
relatively powerful states will be more likely to pro vide sensitive nuclear assistance because they can bet ter deter a nuclear attack does not find empirical support.
The second hypothesis focuses on the existence of a shared rival as an incentive for nuclear supplier states to provide sensitive nuclear assistance. By providing nuclear assistance to a state with which they share a common enemy, nuclear suppliers can impose strate gic costs on rival states. As a reminder, we should ex pect a positive relationship between the existence of a shared enemy and sensitive nuclear assistance. Turn ing first to the bivariate models, we find support for this hypothesis. The relationship between enemy and sensitive nuclear assistance is positive and statistically significant in both bivariate models. The inclusion of control variables does not alter this relationship. In the multivariate models, we again see that the sign on the coefficient for the enemy variable is positive and statis tically significant in every model. The analysis reveals a powerful link between the presence of a common enemy and the patterns of sensitive nuclear assistance. Next, I examine the hypothesis that states that are vulnerable to superpower pressure will be less likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance. In the bivari ate analysis, we find the expected negative correla tions between superpower pact and sensitive nuclear assistance and between superpower vote and sensitive nuclear assistance. We also find the expected posi tive correlation between nuclear weapon and sensitive The findings of this analysis do not support rival ex planations for why states transfer sensitive nuclear ma terials and technology. Some have argued that nuclear weapon states have an incentive to limit the size of the nuclear club. Thus, we may expect that they will be less likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance. This hypothesis, however, is not supported by the evidence. Both the bivariate and multivariate analyses reveal a strong relationship between nuclear weapon and sen sitive nuclear assistance, but in the opposite direction.
As was discussed in the previous paragraph, nuclear weapon states are more, not less, likely to provide sen sitive nuclear assistance, undermining arguments that nuclear weapon states are more likely to oppose nu clear proliferation.
The set of economic variables does not appear to offer much explanatory power either. It has been sug gested that states with lower levels of economic devel opment, or lower levels of economic growth, will be more likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance be cause they will be more willing to take measures to im prove their economic circumstances. This expectation is not met with much empirical support. The variable measuring the level of economic development of the supplier is in the expected direction and is statistically significant in the simple bivariate model, but does not reach statistical significance in any of the other bivari ate or multivariate models.30 Moreover, the sign on eco nomic development is inconsistent, switching from neg ative to positive under different model specifications. The variable for economic growth is not statistically significant in any of the bivariate models. It is statisti cally significant in three of the four multivariate models in which it is included, but the sign on the coefficient is in the unexpected direction, suggesting that states experiencing slow economic growth are actually less likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance. Neither is there a consistent, statistically significant relationship between openness to the international economy and sensitive nuclear assistance. Openness is negative and statistically significant in the simple bivariate model, but is not statistically significant in any of the other models. The coefficient for trade dependence is in the expected direction and is statistically significant in all of the bivariate and multivariate models, suggesting that states are more likely to provide sensitive nuclear as sistance to states with which they possess a close trade relationship.
I briefly comment on the other control variables.31 Distance and distance squared are statistically signifi cant in each of the multivariate models, demonstrating the expected nonmonotonic relationship between dis tance and sensitive nuclear assistance.32 NPT is neg ative and statistically significant in three of the four multivariate models in which it is included.33 Mem bership in the NPT does appear to serve as a con straint on the behavior of the nuclear suppliers.34 NSG is statistically significant and has a positive coefficient in each multivariate model, suggesting that, contrary to expectation, membership in the NSG may actually increase the likelihood that a state will export sensitive nuclear materials and technology. This finding cannot be explained by superior supply capabilities of NSG members because the analysis excludes states that are incapable of providing sensitive nuclear assistance. In stead, this result may be explained by three factors. First, due to its status as a nuclear cartel, the NSG may have failed to acquire international legitimacy and has, therefore, failed to impose a meaningful normative constraint on its members. Second, an adverse selec tion effect in the early days of the NSG may have initially brought in the states that were most likely to export sensitive technologies. These states joined the NSG, but continued to provide sensitive nuclear assistance. For example, the United States convinced a reluctant France to join the regime in 1975, but France continued the construction of a pilot-scale plutonium reprocessing plant in Pakistan until 1982. Third, the guidelines of the NSG allow states to export sensitive nuclear materials and technology as long as the ex ports are placed under international safeguards. NSG states may be more likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance, but they may also be more likely to place their exports under safeguards. Fox example, Germany joined the NSG in 1975 and required safeguards on its sensitive nuclear exports to Brazil from 1978 to 1994.
30
Using GDP, instead of GDP per capita, produces similar results.
31 To ensure that the results were not being driven by the inclusion of specific control variables, I reran scores of models sequentially omitting right-hand-side variables one at a time. The core results were not affected. 32 I also tried the unlogged variables for distance and distance squared. The findings were unaltered. 33 I also included a joint NPT variable indicating whether both the potential recipient and the potential supplier were members of the NPT. To test the hypothesis that the existence of the NPT establishes a norm against nonproliferation, I also tried a dummy variable coded "1" for every observation after 1968 (the year in which the NPT was opened for signature). These variables were not statistically signifi cant. 34 This finding, however, may be driven by the nuclear export be havior of a few key countries. France and China provided sensitive nuclear assistance to a number of other countries before they joined the NPT, and Pakistan, a non-NPT state, has exported sensitive nu clear materials and technology to multiple recipients. In contrast, India and Israel, both non-NPT states, have never exported sensitive nuclear materials or technology. Turning to the demand-side variables, we see that the coefficient on disputes is positive and statistically signif icant in three of the four models in which it is included, indicating that states in a competitive security envi ronment are more likely to receive sensitive nuclear assistance. The sign on superpower vote (recipient) is negative and statistically significant in the multivariate models, suggesting that states that are dependent on a superpower patron are less likely to receive sensitive nuclear assistance. The coefficient on openness (recipi ent) is negative and statistically significant in each mul tivariate model, providing support for the argument that states that are open to the international economy have less demand for nuclear weapons and are thus less likely to receive sensitive nuclear assistance. The other control variables are not statistically significant in any of the models.35 Table 5 interprets the substantive effect of these vari ables on sensitive nuclear assistance, using the results from Table 4 , models 2 and 3. The entries represent the first differences and the relative risks (King and Zeng 2001) of sensitive nuclear assistance for a given change in the independent variable when all other variables are held at their mean. Probabilities are calculated using the approximate Bayesian method for predicting prob abilities in rare events as recommended by King and Zeng (2001) . Table 5 also reports the 95% confidence bounds using the procedure developed by King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000) . Because sensitive nuclear as sistance is a rare event, the differences between prob 35 I also tried models that included variables for the regime type of the recipient, joint democracy of the supplier and the recipient, population size of the supplier and recipient, the number of nuclear weapon states in the international system, and a dummy for the Cold War period. None of these variables achieved statistical significance or altered the core findings. abilities are small. Like other international relations scholars, working with rare events data (e.g., Bennet and Stam 2003), I focus on relative risks to illustrate the substantive effects of the explanatory variables.
Turning first to relative power, Table 5 reveals that a state that lacks the ability to project power over a po tential recipient state is nearly three times more likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance to that state than is a similar state that has the ability to project power over the recipient state.
This effect of relative power on the probability of sensitive nuclear assistance is illustrated in Figure 1 . In Figure 1 , enemy is set to one, superpower pact is set to zero, and all other variables are held at their mean. The dashed lines represent the 95% confidence interval. Figure 1 demonstrates a clear negative rela tionship between relative power and the probability of sensitive nuclear assistance. When the capable nu clear supplier lacks the ability to project power over the potential recipient (represented in the graph by negative values of relative power), there is a substantial risk that the supplier state will export sensitive nu clear materials and technology. As the relative power distribution shifts in favor of the potential supplier, however, the risk that a state will export sensitive nu clear materials and technology declines. The proba bility of sensitive nuclear assistance decreases to near zero as the capable nuclear supplier gains the ability to project power over the potential nuclear recipient Returning to the substantive effect of the other vari ables reported in Table 5 , we see that states are over seven times more likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance to a state with which they share an enemy than to a comparable state that is not threatened by a common enemy. A state that is not dependent on a superpower patron by virtue of a defense pact with a superpower is nearly five times more likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance than is a similar state that is dependent on a superpower patron. Furthermore, a state that is not dependent on a superpower patron, as measured by UNGA voting data, is about three times more likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance than is a similar state that is dependent on a superpower. The substantive importance of these variables is also evident when they are taken together (not shown). Sensitive nuclear assistance, a rare event, is extremely unlikely to occur under typical circumstances. Indeed, the baseline probability that a nuclear transaction will occur in any given dyad-year when all explanatory variables are held at their mean is .2%.36 When the three strategic variables are set to the worst-case sce nario (i.e., relative power and superpower pact set to their minimums and enemy set to its maximum), how ever, and all other variables are held at their mean, the probability of sensitive nuclear assistance increases to 62%. effect, but also a substantively significant effect on the probability of sensitive nuclear assistance. Turning now to the substantive effect of the control variables, Table 5 shows that NPT membership has a substantive effect on the patterns of sensitive nuclear assistance. Non-NPT members are over eight times more likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance than are states that are members of the NPT In contrast, trade dependence has a small substantive effect on states' propensity to export sensitive nuclear technolo gies. States that are heavily dependent on trade with a particular trading partner are only about 36% more likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance to that state than is a similar state that has no trade relation ship whatsoever with that state. Thirty-six percent may not be a significant difference when one considers that a state with very high levels of trade with a particular state should be much more likely (indeed, more than 36% more likely) to trade any product with that state than with a similar state with which the supplier has absolutely no trade relationship.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This article explains why states provide sensitive nuclear assistance to nonnuclear weapon states, contributing to the international spread of nuclear weapons. I found that in order to explain patterns of sensitive nuclear assistance, one must look to the strategic environment of the nuclear supplier. The costs of the spread of nuclear weapons are concentrated on relatively powerful states. This simple logic of the dif ferential costs of nuclear proliferation leads states to provide sensitive nuclear assistance under three con ditions. First, because nuclear proliferation constrains states' ability to use conventional military power to their advantage, the more powerful a state is relative to a potential nuclear recipient, the less likely it is to provide sensitive nuclear assistance. States do not want to impose constraints on themselves. Second, pre cisely because nuclear proliferation constrains states' military freedom of action, however, states are more likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance to states with which they share a common enemy. By provid ing sensitive nuclear assistance to these states, a nu clear supplier can impose strategic costs on rival states.
Finally, because superpowers, states with global force projection capabilities, are threatened by nuclear pro liferation anywhere in the international system, they pressure other states in an attempt to prevent sen sitive nuclear transfers. States that are vulnerable to superpower pressure are less likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance.
Arguments that contend that states are driven to provide sensitive nuclear assistance by an economic profit motive do not find support in the data. There is no discernable relationship between poor economic performance and sensitive nuclear assistance. This is not to say that economic motivations are irrelevant to state decisions to transfer sensitive nuclear materials and technology. Indeed, in many cases in which sensi tive nuclear transfers occurred, the nuclear suppliers did seek economic benefits. What these findings do suggest, however, is that states are unlikely to pursue economic gains when the result undermines their own security. States may still seek economic benefits when they export sensitive nuclear technology, but they are only likely to do so when such behavior is consistent with underlying strategic conditions. The empirical analysis provides some reassurance to proponents of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The findings suggest that NPT members are less likely than non-NPT members to export sensitive nuclear materials and technology. Yet, the analysis also shows that NSG members are more likely to conduct sensitive nuclear transfers. The international institutions of the nuclear nonproliferation regime do not appear to im pose a consistent restraining effect on sensitive nuclear exports.
This research on the causes of sensitive nuclear as sistance suggests a new, supply-side approach to the study of nuclear proliferation. Scholars have analyzed state decisions to pursue nuclear weapons, but have not explained, through a theoretical lens, the behavior by other states that facilitates or impedes the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries. There is substantial variation in whether, and the degree to which, states support or oppose nuclear proliferation to additional states. At one extreme, as this research shows, states are willing to provide sensitive nuclear assistance to help other states acquire nuclear weapons. At the other extreme, states are so opposed to nuclear proliferation in another state that they are willing to use military force to stop it. There are other more mod erate measures by which states can affect the supply of nuclear proliferation. States show different inclina tions to vote for or against nuclear nonproliferation measures in the IAEA Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council. States also vary in their willingness to apply sanctions against states that are developing nuclear programs. All topics could be come the focus of future scholarly inquiry. In fact, the conditions that determine whether states provide sensi tive nuclear assistance may also shape state responses to other issue areas related to the supply of nuclear proliferation. For example, if relatively powerful states are more threatened by nuclear proliferation, as this article claims, we may expect that they may be more likely to support measures, such as preventive military strikes, designed to prevent other states from acquiring nuclear weapons.
The theoretical approach of this article may pro vide a helpful framework for the study of conventional arms transfers. Blanton (2000 Blanton ( , 2005 has argued that the United States is more likely to transfer conven tional arms to democratic countries. In contrast, this study found, analyzing the entire universe of nuclear suppliers, that power-based factors are paramount and that the regime type of the recipient does not affect decisions to transfer sensitive nuclear materials and technology.38 Scholars could seek to understand fur ther the conditions under which states export conven tional military hardware by examining systematically the entire universe of potential suppliers and by in cluding the strategic factors identified here among the explanatory variables. It is possible that relative power, the presence of a common enemy, and superpower de pendence shape the probability that states will transfer conventional military, as well as nuclear materials and technology.
The argument of this article began with a simple insight grounded in the nuclear deterrence literature about the differential effects of nuclear proliferation. The existing scholarship on the consequences of nu clear proliferation has centered around the debate about whether the spread of nuclear weapons gen erates more or less stability at the level of the inter national system (e.g., Sagan and Waltz 1995) . There has been less of a focus, however, on whether nuclear proliferation may threaten certain types of states more than others. The findings of this article are consis tent with the observation that the spread of nuclear weapons may be worse for relatively powerful states than it is for relatively weak states. The spread of nuclear weapons imposes strategic costs on relatively powerful states because it undermines their ability to tap conventional military power as a source of strate gic advantage. To the degree that nuclear proliferation Each of the three hypotheses presented in this arti cle can guide intelligence analysts and policy makers as they attempt to identify and deter future nuclear suppliers. First, as a state's ability to project power in creases or decreases, its propensity to provide sensitive nuclear assistance will adjust accordingly. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was a superpower with global force projection capabilities and nuclear prolif eration anywhere threatened to constrain its military power. Partly for this reason, the Soviet Union took a tough stand against nuclear proliferation and was loathe to provide sensitive nuclear assistance. How ever, Moscow's conventional military power collapsed along with the Soviet Union, and nuclear prolifera tion was no longer a limiting factor on Moscow's force projection capability. In this altered security environ ment, Russia became more willing to provide sensitive nuclear assistance. In 1995, for example, just five years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia offered to construct a uranium enrichment facility in Iran.40 China is on the opposite trajectory. China's power projection capability has traditionally been limited to a handful of states on its immediate borders. For most of the nuclear era, nuclear proliferation to states beyond this sphere of influence did not directly undermine Chinese power. In recent years, however, as China modernizes its military forces and begins to think about projecting force abroad, it is likely becoming more concerned that nuclear proliferation in distant regions could constrain its military might. This consideration may be contribut ing to the decline in sensitive nuclear exports from, and a heightened attention to nuclear nonproliferation in, Beijing. Second, officials must recognize that states that are threatened by U.S. power can provide sensitive nuclear assistance to Washington's enemies in order to con strain US. military freedom of action. Military leaders in Pakistan, for example, supported sensitive nuclear exports to Iran, Libya, and North Korea in part be cause they assessed that, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States had become too powerful in the Middle East and South Asia. They believed that by providing sensitive nuclear assistance to a band of states hostile to Washington, Pakistan, with the support of China, could form an alliance of "strategic defiance" against the United States.41
Third, policy makers should beware of the end of security alliances. States that depend on a superpower to provide for their security are less likely to export sen sitive nuclear materials and technology. The collapse of the Soviet Union left a number of states without a superpower patron. North Korea, for example, may be at risk of providing sensitive nuclear assistance in part because it can do so without antagonizing a pow erful protector. Officials must recognize that nuclear umbrellas can reduce the supply of, as well as the de mand for, nuclear materials and technology. Correctly understanding the conditions under which states pro vide sensitive nuclear assistance matters not only for the scholarly study of nuclear proliferation, but also for efforts to prevent the further spread of the world's most dangerous weapon.
Appendix A: Cases of Sensitive Nuclear Assistance U.S.S.R to China (1958-60 (Cirincione et al. 2002,225; Cohen 1998, 73-5; NTI exports, see, e.g., Corera 2006,74-9. but to explicitly authorize French firms to continue the con struction of the sensitive, plutonium reprocessing facility in Israel. France to Japan (1971-4) . France constructed a pilot-scale reprocessing plant for Japan at Tokai Mura (Gale 1978 (Gale ,1124 Lester 1982, 422; Reiss 1988,115 (Spector 1990, 90-117; Weissman and Krosney 1981, 74-84, 161-74) .
France to Taiwan (1975) . France agreed to provide Taiwan with a plutonium reprocessing facility. The French were able to transfer some of the component parts for the facility before United States dismantled the facilities related to reprocessing and confiscated the component parts (Spector 1984, 342-4; Weissman and Krosney 1981,152-3) .
Italy to Iraq (1976-8) . Italy constructed a radiochemistry lab consisting of three lead-shielded hot cells capable of re processing plutonium in Iraq (NTI; Weissman and Krosney 1981, 97-9) . Germany to Brazil (1979-94 (Jones et al. 1998, 231-42; NTI; Spector 1990, 242-66) .
France to Egypt (1980-2) . France constructed two hot cells for plutonium reprocessing in the Hot Laboratory and Waste Management Center in Egypt (Bhatia 1988,61; NTI) . China to Pakistan (1981-3; 1984-6) . In the early 1980s, China supplied Pakistan with a nuclear weapon design and enough highly enriched uranium for two nuclear weapons. Later, China is believed to have assisted Pakistan with the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant. In the 1990s, China also helped Pakistan with its reprocessing facility at Chasma. In 1995, China provided Pakistan with 5,000 ring magnets, a component part for use in a gaseous centrifuge uranium enrichment plant (Jones et al. 1998, 50, 57-8n; NTI; Shuey and Kan 1995 China to Iran (1984 Iran ( , 1987 Iran ( , 1989 Iran ( , 1995 . China provided
Iran with calutrons, a key component part for uranium enrich ment using the electromagnetic isotope separation method (Albright, Berkhout, and Walker 1997,359-60; NTI) . China to Algeria (1986-91) . China constructed hot cells for Algeria at Ain Oussera and began the installation of a larger plutonium reprocessing facility (Albright and Hinderstein 2001; Jones et al. 1998,163) . Pakistan to Iran (1987-95 Netherlands to Pakistan (1974-76) . While working in the Netherlands in the mid-1970s, Pakistani scientist A.Q, Khan smuggled uranium enrichment designs and equipment from the Netherlands to Pakistan without the knowledge and ap proval of the Dutch government (Corera 2006 Russia to Iran (1995-present France (1970s and 1980s) . In this time period, the United States provided assistance to France de signed primarily to improve the safety and security of French warheads (Ullman 1989 United States to India (1961 India ( , 2005 . A U.S. firm, Vitro In ternational, prepared blueprints for the construction of the physical site at the Trombay reprocessing facility in 1961, but did not work on the sensitive nuclear technologies. The sensitive technologies in the Trombay reprocessing facility were developed autonomously with the aid of declassified documents on plutonium reprocessing made available by the United Nations (Jones et al. 1998,112; Perkovich 1999, 28 
